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AFTER DOOMSDAY ..•• 
THE CONVENTION AND SCOTLAND'S CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS 
lain Macwhirter 
Introduction 
The scene is a press conference in Labour's Glasgow headquarters in 
Keir Hardie House, a week before the Glasgow Central by-election. 
Labour's Foreign Affairs spokesman Gerald Kaufman had come north for 
the day to do his bit. What, he was asked by a journalist, did he think of the 
idea of Independence in the UK? A look of distaste crossed Mr Kaufman's 
face. "What does it mean?'' he snapped, "It's not worthy ofthe name 'idea' . 
If someone knows what it means, I wish they'd tell me". Journalists stifled 
grins as the Scottish Secretary of the Labour Party, Murray Elder, reached 
out and grasped Mr Kaufman's arm. Quietly, but firmly, he reminded the 
senior shadow cabinet member that this was, in fact, Labour Party policy on 
Scotland. 
Only Mr Kaufman's debating skill prevented this being the worst 
Labour gaffe since the leader of the Party, Neil Kinnock, had compared 
devolution to environmental conditions in the Himalayas in 1988. Mr 
Kaufman, of course, had come prepared to rubbish the SNP's policy of 
'Independence in Europe'. His understandable confusion over the use of 
the '1'-word was a measure of just how far Labour policy had been 
transformed as a result of their participation in the Constitutional 
Convention. 
The fact that 'Independence in the UK' is something of a contradiction 
in terms is not the point. Labour MPs and party activists have been 
genuinely surprised, and many of them much gratified- by Labour's new 
attitude to the National Question. In the 1970s, Labour's devolution 
proposals were a more or less cynical attempt to stifle the Scottish National 
Party. In 1989, by contrast, Labour have managed to grasp the initiative, 
and have frustrated the nationalists - at least for the time being - by 
abjuring all devolutionary formulae, in favour of what activists call the 'Big 
I', Donald Dewar's 'Independence in the UK'. There is a new hardness 
about Labour's policy on Scottish Home Rule. This has been almost 
entirely a result of pressure from outside; pressure which has been 
contained and focussed by the C<?nvention. 
The origins of the Scottish Constitutional Convention are to be found, 
like so much of recent Scottish Politics, in the constitutional crisis - the 
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Doomsday Scenario- into which Scotland gingerly stepped after the 1987 
General Election. The Scottish Conservatives had lost eleven MPs, 
including two Scottish Office Ministers, the Scottish Whip, and the 
Solicitor General for Scotland. Labour had returned 50 out of the 72 MPs, 
and with the Scottish Democrats and lhe SNP, the combined Scottish 
Opposition outnumbered the party of Government by nearly six to one. 
This chapter charts the events leading up to the first meeting of the 
Constitutional Convention in March 1989, and argues that these events 
have resulted in the transformation of the Labour Party's approach to the 
National Question. 
The Road to the Convention 
Following the 1987 General Election the Conservatives peered over 
the brink of political oblivion- a bleak counterpoint to Mrs Thatcher's third 
victory with a hundred seat majority in the UK - and many on the 
intellectual wing of the Tory party in Scotland decided that only devolution, 
or at least constitutional change, could start the revival of Scottish 
Conservatism. In July 1987, a document was prepared for the Scott-ish 
Conservative and Unionist Association by senior party officials which 
concluded that Mrs Thatcher might actually be an "electoral liability" in 
Scotland. Visits to Scotland by Cabinet figures had been "counter-
productive". The report, which some said betrayed the hand of the liberal 
Tory lawyer Professor Ross Harper, was called "The Way Forward". It 
demanded a debate on devolution and called for a change of policy and 
presentation in Scotland. The document was extensively leaked over the 
summer of 1987 and its significance was that it contributed to a general, 
inchoate mood in Scotland for a change in the constitutional relationship 
with England. This mood was above party, and largely above class. 
It is certain that the Scottish Secretary Malcolm Rifkind examined 
"The Way Forward" closely. It might even have concurred with his own 
thinking. Mr Rifkind had voted "Yes" in the 1979 Devolution Referendum, 
and while he says now that this was a mistake, he still admits to finding 
federalism "intellectually appealing". But above all he is a shrewd 
politician, and a realist. Mr Rifkind laid "The Way Forward" aside. It was 
not the time for a dialogue on the Constitution. The priority, as he saw it, 
was political stabilisation in Scotland. That meant stability within the 
prevailing order, and under the radical terms set by Mrs Thatcher for her 
third administration. 
Very soon it became clear that the Scots were not going to take to the 
streets over Home Rule. "Devolution had not been an issue on the 
doorsteps during the election", was the line put out by the Scottish Office. 
In other words, 'the Scots may not like Mrs Thatcher, but that does not 
mean that in 1987 they were voting for devolution'. In taking this line, the 
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Scottish Tories unwittingly set the terrain on which the next General 
Election is to be fought. The energies of supporters of Home Rule turned in 
1988 to the problem of how to make absolutely sure that in the next election 
a Scottish Assembly would be an issue, and that the message would be 
communicated clearly and unequivocally that Scotland wanted self-
government. 
Mr Rifkind's difficulties in filling first the Scottish Office ministerial 
team, and then the various House of Commons committees were 
presented, in the Scottish press, as examplars of 'bunker Toryism'. Two of 
the five remaining back-bench Tories- Allan Stewart and Bill Walker-
refused to take part in the Scottish Select Committee. Mr Walker said it 
would be "a waste of his valuable time". And though the Scottish Select 
Committee is not strictly speaking the responsibility of the Government, 
Mr Rifkind drew some sharp fire from the opinion columns for allowing the 
Scottish Select Committee to lapse. After Scottish Question Time and the 
Scottish Grand Committee, the Scottish Select Committee was the only 
remaining form of back-bench scrutiny of the Scottish Administration. Its 
demise brought the question of 'accountability' into sharp focus. 
But while Mr Rifkind had presentational difficulties over his lack of 
foot-soldiers, he could console himself with the thought that he, as he 
remarked himself, had the "Gattling Gun". Labour had lots of noisy MPs 
but Rifkind had the hundred seat Conservative majority in a unitary House 
of Commons and that would guarantee that decibels were all that Labour 
could deliver. 
The 1987 General Election was as much a crisis for Labour's Scottish 
leader Donald Dewar- at least in the short term- as it was a disaster for the 
Scottish Tories. Mr Dewar was, and is, a supporter of devolution, but he is 
also a constitutionalist who did not endorse the growing clamour from 
within his party for some kind of extra-parliamentary action to expose the 
lack of a Government 'mandate' in Scotland. At the first Scottish Question 
Time of the new parliament, when Denis Canavan the nco-nationalist 
Labour MP for Falkirk West, drew attention to the presence of 31 Tories 
from English constituencies on the Government benches by crying "I spy 
strangers", his leader drew back. In the subsequent division Labour were at 
odds, and some Labour backbenchers lamented the loss of a rare 
opportunity to expose the paucity of Scottish Tory MPs. Over the winter of 
1987/88 there were mutterings from the Scottish Labour back-bench and 
the constituency parties that 'Donald was not the man for the job'. He was 
'too responsible' and 'colourless' and altogether too thrawn to the rules of 
the Commons club. However, there was no-one else in Labour ranks who 
could do the parliamentary job ha_lf as well, and the 'rebellion' was confined 
to the pubs. But Labour's failure to make anything of their electoral success 
stimulated the growth of a new 'grassroots' nco-nationalist tendency in the 
Scottish Party, which was to emerge at the 1988 Scottish Conference as 
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"Scottish Labour Action" (SLA). This ginger group was to have a major 
impact on Labour's trajectory, and on its attitude to the Convention. 
SLA - or the 'Scottish Liberation Army' as some activists dubbed it-
leapt over the head of the Labour Co-ordinating Committee and other 
tendencies, to become the most influential grouping within Scottish Labour 
Politics. It's agenda was to challenge the introduction of the poll tax, or 
community charge, by civil disobedience if necessary, and to do this with 
the intention of challenging the Government's mandate to rule in Scotland. 
It wanted action from Scottish MPs and called on them to stop playing by 
the 'club rules' in Westminster. SLA won the support of at least five Labour 
MPs, including Robin Cook, George Galloway and Dick Douglas, which 
must go down as one of the most bizarre alliances in Scottish Labour 
history. The founders of SLA- a Glasgow Lawyer called Ian Smart, and the 
Edinburgh Labour activist, Bob McLean- became minor celebrities on the 
constituency speaking circuit. They firmly rejected Labour's traditional 
policy of legislative devolution, echoing Enoch Powell's dictum that 'power 
devolved is power retained'. But they as yet had no alternative. 
A Claim of Right 
In the dark years of the early 80s, the Home Rule flame had been kept 
alight by a handful of dedicated devolutionaries in the Campaign for a 
Scottish Assembly (CSA). The indefatigable chairman of CSA, Jim 
Boyack, was to be seen annually at the party conferences lapelling anyone 
within lobbying range. Another prominent activist in CSA was Jim Ross, a 
retired senior civil servant at the Scottish Office, who had headed the 
Devolution Division under the last Labour Government. After 1987, Mr 
Ross turned his formidable intellect to the task of turning the potential 
constitutional crisis of 1987 into an actual one, and in doing so undermining 
the unitary British State. Under the auspices of the CSA, he condensed his 
insights into a document called A Claim of Right for Scotland. This is now 
widely acknowledged as one of the important documents of contemporary 
British history. To date, more than two thousand copies have been sold. Its 
importance lies in the cogency of its analysis of the crisis facing the British 
Constitution, and its almost Leninist hard-headedness about organisation. 
It is worth quoting the Claim of Right at length: 
"Scotland is facing a crisis of identity and survival. It is being Governed 
without consent and subject to the declared intention of having imposed 
upon it a radical change of outlook and behaviour which it shows no sign 
of wanting. All questions as to whether consent shoulp be part of 
government are brushed aside ... Scottish history is selectively distorted 
and the Scots are told that their votes are lying; that they secretly love 
what they constantly vote against.. ... But Scotland is unique both in its 
title to complain and in its awareness of what is being done to it." 
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"We are under no illusions about the seriousness of what we 
recommend. Contesting the authority of established government is not a 
light matter. We could not recommend it if we did not feel that British 
Government has so decayed that there is little hope of it being reformed 
within the framework of its traditional procedures". 
"Scotland; if it is to remain Scotland, can no longer live with such a 
constitution, and has nothing to hope from it. Scots have shown it more 
tolerance than it deserves. They must now show enterprise by starting 
the reform of their own government. They have the opportunity, in the 
process, to start the reform of the English constitution; to serve as the 
grit in the oyster which produces the pearl." (Claim of Right p.23-24). 
The founding document of the Scottish Constitutional Convention did 
not exactly fall dead from the presses, but neither did it seem about to 
arouse Scotland from its constiutional slumbers. The Claim of Right was 
launched at a down-beat press conference in Edinburgh's George Hotel in 
the middle of the political off-season in July 1988. A collection of the great 
and the good of radical Scottish politics, chaired rather haltingly by Sir 
Robert Grieve, it appeared to many of the journalists present to be the 
launch of just 'another pamphlet' on devolution. The Conservatives 
dismissed it as more devolutionary 'mumbo jumbo'. The SNP claimed that 
they had been the first to call for a Constitutional Convention and that the 
document simply rehashed Labourite devolution from 1978. Labour's 
Scottish leader Donald Dewar was not happy, initially, with the references 
to "breakdown of respect for law" (p.ll ), and "contesting the authority of 
established government" (p.24). Labour, he said, would have to think very 
carefully about the wisdom of joining any "extra-parliamentary talking 
shop". However, in a remarkably short time Mr Dewar was to become 
something of an enthusiast. 
It is not clear exactly when the decision was made to take Labour into 
the Convention. Even members of Labour's Scottish Executive seem 
confused about precisely when the transition was made. The question was 
put to Labour Party affiliates in a consultation exercise in Autumn 1988. 
But the pace was forced by, of all people, Donald Dewar, who became 
convinced of the case for a Claim of Right sometime in September 1988. On 
October 21st he delivered an address to students in Stirling University 
which made clear Labour's intention to participate. "Scots", he said, "are 
going to have to learn to live dangerously for a while." 
Origins of the Convention 
The sequence of events is more than usually important, here, for there 
is already inaccuracy creeping into accounts of the origins of the 
Convention. Some have suggested that Labour went into the Convention as 
a panic reaction to their defeat in the Glasgow Govan by-election. This 
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sounds plausible, especially to cynics both in and out of the Labour 
Movement, but it is not true. The Govan by-election took place on lOth 
November 1988, by which time Labour was already in. The decision was 
taken at the September Scottish Executive to call for a positive response to 
the consultation and by the end of October 1989 the result supported 
participation by 32-2. 
Of course, the Govan disaster, where Labour lost a 19,500 majority 
and one of the safest Labour seats in the land to Jim Sillars, was a profound 
shock to the Labour movement as a whole, and reinforced the leadership's 
conviction that there was no alternative to the Convention road. Govan 
exposed deep disillusion and unease in the Party about Labour's conduct of 
Scottish politics since the General Election. The SNP's jibe of 'feeble fifty' 
had hurt. Neil Kinnock was not trusted on the Scottish question, 
particularly after his dismissal of Home Rule at the 1988 Party Conference. 
Donald Dewar had been humiliated, said activists, by his "slavish" 
adherence to the rules of Westminster. Party workers had voted with their 
canvass cards in Govan and had stayed away in droves. 
The week after the SNP victory SLA issued a leaflet headed "Gubbed 
in Govan". "The slaughter on the Southside", it said, "was a vote of no 
confidence in Labour's Scottish leadership and their inability to come to 
terms with the Scottish Dimension". The pamphlet called on Labour to 
participate fully in the Constitutional Convention, and foster a "cross-party 
consensus on Home Rule". 
It is curious, given the SNP's subsequent attitude to the Convention, 
that the morning after Govan, Jim Sillars, the new nationalist MP, agreed 
that his victory underlined the need for cross-party cooperation. Sillars 
called for a "dialogue" with all those in the Labour Party who supported 
Home Rule. He made it clear that he felt Scotland could only achieve self-
government by concerted action, and not by narrow party defensiveness. If 
this was an endorsement of the Convention, it was not one that was to last. 
After Govan, Scotland became a news story again. Foreign camera 
crews, and newspaper journalists began trekking across the country 
looking for the answer to the 'Scottish Question'. It was just like the 1970's 
all over again, and great fun for those in the business. The SNP remained 
high in the opinion polls for four months. In January 1989 the SNP stood 
(according to System Three) at 32%, only four percent behind Labour. It 
was the party's best performance since 1977, and moreover, coincided with 
polling evidence that the Scots were becoming interested in the SNP's idea 
of Independence in Europe. Of course, opinion polls often just tell you 
what you want to hear. The same polls suggested that Independence from 
England was still profoundly unpopular. But it was powerful stuff, and it 
went to the nationalists' heads. 
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The Conservatives watched developments after Govan more intrigued 
than alarmed. The Health and Education Minister, Michael Forsyth, said 
that if nothing else, the "log jam of Scottish Politics" had been broken by 
the SNP victory. Alan Stewart, the Tory MP for Eastwood, and a former 
Scottish Office Minister, said that Independence made more sense than 
devolution, and that perhaps it was time for the Scots to make up their 
minds once arid for all. This sentiment was echoed by Bill Walker the MP 
for Tayside North. He told Mrs Thatcher that she should call a snap 
referendum on the single question of "Independence or the Union", and 
destroy Labour on the rack of nationalism. Malcolm Rifkind said Labour 
were reaping the reward of their "flirtation with nationalist rhetoric''. 
Privately, some Tories saw possible electoral windfalls from an SNP 
revival, as the nationalists split the opposition vote, and allowed 'Tory' 
seats like Strathkelvin and Bearsden to return to the fold. Other 
Conservatives feared that this opportunistic approach might polarise 
Scottish politics to such a degree that the Tories might actually succeed in 
demolishing the very Union they sought to defend. 
The Scottish Democrats called for the Treaty of Union to be 
renegotiated. Their Scottish leader, Malcolm Bruce, said that "devolution 
was dead", and that the way forward was via cross-party Constitutional 
Convention which would mobilise popular support for a Scottish 
Parliament. It's easy to dismiss the Scottish Democrats as an irrelevance, 
given their self-destructive tendencies since the merger of the old Alliance 
parties. But the party had, and has, nine Scottish MPs, only one less than 
the Tories. Moreover, the Democrats and their predecessors could claim, 
justifiably, to have been the most consistent supporters of Home Rule in 
Scottish Politics since the War, and to have backed the Constitutional 
Convention from the outset. They sought a role as mediators, and at the 
start of the process of forming the Convention, they carried considerable 
moral weight. 
The Role of the SNP 
The first formal cross-party talks on the Scottish Constitutional 
Convention took place on 27th January 1989. The SNP leader Gordon 
Wilson, Labour's Donald Dewar, and the Democrat leader Malcolm Bruce 
led delegations into the COSLA offices in Edinburgh to hammer out the 
ground rules for the project. The discussions were, according to observers, 
tough-minded but positive. Some Labour members found it difficult to 
believe they were actually sitting around a table with Jim Sillars, the former 
Labour MP who had tried to set up his own Scottish Labour Party in the 
1970s before switching to the SNP. Mr Sillars probably felt a sense of 
unreality too. 
Negotiations that day centred around three SNP demands. First, 
representation. The nationalists were not prepared to accept the 8% of the 
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Convention's seats which had been allocated to them by the steering 
committee. This had been calculated on the basis of the 1987 General 
Election result. But high in the polls after Govan- only 4% behind labour-
the SNP demanded that this be increased. The second issue on that day was 
sovereignty. The SNP wanted assurances that the Convention was not 
simply going to be a Labour front organisation; one that would just endorse 
old-style devolution. They wanted a commitment to the Sovereignty of the 
Scottish people; an implicit rejection of Westminster's mandate in 
Scotland. The final SNP demand was the most awkward, legitimisation. 
The Claim for Right had suggested that, at the end of its year-long 
deliberations, the Convention should ideally put its findings to the Scottish 
people in some kind of Referendum or other 'test of opinion' . The SNP 
wanted a multi-option Referendum, in which the option of 'Independence 
in Europe' would be included, along with the status quo and devolution. 
Some in the SNP say now that these were intended to be demands 
which Labour could never accept. All the more surprising, then, that 
Labour more or less accepted the first two, at least in principle. On the 
multi-option Referendum, Labour offered a compromise. The SNP were 
concerned that because Labour were the dominant force in the Convention 
(however you did the arithmetic) then their wishes would inevitably 
prevail. Labour offered 'progress by consensus', which meant that they 
would agree not to force a vote on any issue of principle for the SNP or the 
Democrats. After three and a half hours of discussion, it was agreed by all 
parties that these issues would not be resolved then and there. The press 
were told that a business committee would be set up, along with a 
secretariat, and the parties would agree to participate in the first full 
plenary of the Convention on 30th March in Edinburgh. 
The three party leaders gave the largest media news conference that 
Scotland has seen for any non-election political event since the 1970's. 
Malcolm Bruce, the Democrat leader called it an "historic event". Donald 
Dewar, looking more than usually thoughtful, said that there was "a long 
hard road ahead", but that "useful work had been done, and there was a 
basis to move forward and to explore common ground and work to a 
common programme". Even the SNP leader Gordon Wilson said that the 
meeting had been "very successful". All agreed that there would be further 
cross-party talks. 
Gordon Wilson was careful at that news conference to make it clear 
that SNP participation in the March 30th Convention "could not be 
assumed". But such is the power of the image in modern poJitics, that the 
mere TV pictures of the three leaders sitting together, smiling and 
apparently agreeing with each other, was enough to set SNP traditionalists 
on fire. 
Over that weekend the SNP negotiating team (Jim Sillars, Margaret 
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Ewing and Gordon Wilson) were beseiged by angry nationalists accusing 
them of naivete, stupidity and even treachery. Gordon Wilson spoke to the 
principle office-bearers in the party by telephone, and found overwhelming 
opposition to continued participation. The only executive member to be 
wholeheartedly in favour of participation (or at least the only one to say so 
openly) was the Glasgow sociologist Isobel Lindsay, who was also on the 
CSA steering'committee. On January 27th, Jim Sillars had told the media 
to expect a response to the cross-party talks "within a week", but something 
like mild panic gripped the leadership over that weekend. By Sunday night 
the die was cast. Jim Sillars issued a press release declaring that the SNP 
would not take part in "Labour's Convention", which was simply rehashing 
Labourite devolution. "It was rigged" said the SNP MP for Govan. 
The SNP's boycott of the Convention was to cost the Party dear. They 
insist that they did not "withdraw" from the Convention; they just decided 
not to join it. But the point was, it looked as if they had withdrawn, and that 
cast the SNP in the invidious role of wreckers of the emerging Scottish 
consensus. They were kicked unceremoniously about the opinion columns 
of the Scottish press. The Scotsman said that the SNP had been "reckless, 
irresponsible and short-sighted". The Glasgow Herald remarked gloomily 
that it had been "an old story. Our chronic inability to unite is a national 
curse". In March the opinion polls delivered their verdict- a five point drop 
according to System Three- and the SNP started a slippage which has not 
yet ended. At the time of writing (September 1989) the SNP have slumped 
to 22% according to System Three- down 10% on January 1989. 
For a while it appeared as if the SNP might even split. A group of 
activists including Isobel Lindsay and individual councillors like Dr Flora 
Isles of Tayside, started a campaign to get the SNP back into the 
Convention. They argued that the negotiating committee did not have the 
right to make such a decision without putting the issue to a meeting of the 
SNP's National Council, which is a kind of 'parliament' of the party. The 
SNP Council met to decide whether or not to endorse the leadership's line 
in Port Glasgow on the 4th of March. It was immediately clear that the 
mood of the gathering was strongly anti-Convention. Isobel Lindsay was 
heckled and jeered as she tried to argue that the Scottish people would not 
understand the SNP's rejection of the cross-party campaign. Alex 
Salmond, the deputy leader of the party, who had once been thought to be a 
supporter of the Convention, rounded on Ms Lindsay calling her "more 
reactionary than Charles Gray". Comparing an SNP executive member to 
the Labour leader of Strathclyde Region is the most outrageous abuse in 
the SNP lexicon, and Mr Salmond was taken to task by other speakers. Jim 
Sillars said that winning Independence for Scotland in Europe would 
require "rock-hard principle, nQt the marshmallow politics of Labour's 
Convention." The motion rejecting the Convention was overwhelmingly 
adopted. 
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It was clear to observers at the 4th March Council that the SNP's 
problem with the Convention had little to do with multi-option 
referendums or how many seats they would have. The SNP were opposed 
to the Convention because, as Gordon Wilson said, it would inevitably lead 
to Labour devolution "which had failed i·n the 1970's and would fail again". 
The party fundamentalists remembered only too well how in 1979 they 
were taken first by the hand by Labour only later to be taken by the throat. 
The SNP had divided over the 1979 Devolution Referendum. They had 
been attacked for ushering in the Thatcher decade by voting down the last 
Labour Government after the Referendum debacle. Everyone in Port 
Glasgow that Saturday remembered the divisions in the party over the 
emergence of the '79 group, and the expulsions and bitterness that followed 
in the early 1980s. The vote on March 4th was not so much a vote against a 
Convention, as a vote against Labour and a declaration of party unity. 
With hindsight, it was probably a mistake for the SNP to have got 
involved with the Convention at all. But their brief involvement, forced 
Labour into concessions which it might not otherwise have been prepared 
to yield. Labour had agreed to 'progress by consensus', to sovereignty, and 
to some form of referendum, or electoral test of the Convention outcome. 
Moreover, Labour were able to argue, convincingly, that they had done 
their bit for cross-party unity; it was the SNP who were the sectarians, and 
were in an "informal alliance" with the Tories against the wishes of the 
Scottish people. 
The Conservatives, were enjoying all this hugely. The Chief Executive 
of the Scottish Conservatives, John MacKay pronounced the Convention a 
failure. It was now just the usual line up of Labour MPs, Labour 
councillors, Labour trades unions, and Labour acdemics, with few 
Democrat fellow-travellers. It was, said Mr MacKay, just "the Labour 
Party Conference at prayer". 
And when the Convention did finally meet, in the Assembly Halls on 
Edinburgh's Mound on Thursday March 30th, it did look, from the press 
gallery, rather like an assembly of refugees from the 1970's, a roll call of 
Scottish radicalism. AU the more surprising then that it should have been 
such a success. 
The First Meeting of the Convention 
The Convention was extremely well stage-managed. The documents, 
the agenda and the procedure were professional thanks t9 the COSLA 
Secretariat, under Bruce Black. It was a mature gathering; the heads 
certainly in the public galleries, were mostly silver, a bit like the dark-
brown paintings on the walls of Kirk Assemblies of the last Century. 
Canon Kenyon Wright, the moral leader of the Convention gave a 
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clever speech milking the similarity between the 1989 gathering and the 
Claim of Right made by the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland in 
1842 in the same Hall. Canon Wright insisted that, even without the SNP, 
the Convention represented more than 80% of Scotland's MPs, and with all 
the other bodies present, from Islands Councils (quite a coup given the 
Islands' hostility to devolution in the '70s) to small businessmen, the 
Convention 'was "'much more representative of Scotland than the 
Westminster Parliament is of the UK". 
"But what of implementation" continued Canon Wright, "what if that 
other single voice we all know so well responds by saying 'We say no and we 
are the State'. Well, we say yes and we are the people". It was a 
marvellously crafted sound-bite, and apparently found its way onto prime-
time television news in the United States. 
But what did the March Convention actually achieve? Well, it would 
have been a lot to expect from one gathering ofthe home rule class that they 
would actually devise, there and then, a blueprint for a Scottish Assembly 
that would work, without getting tied up in 'West Lothian Questions', and 
metaphysical speculation about the powers of the putative Scottish 
Parliament. No, the importance of the March Convention was symbolic. To 
get all the Labour MPs, and Council leaders to line up before the 
moderators chair, like schoolchildren at assembly, and to sign a 
Declaration of the Sovereignty of the Scottish people was marvellous 
political theatre. This is the text that now bears their signatures: 
"We, gathered as the Scottish Constitutional Convention, do hereby 
acknowledge the soveriegn right of the Scottish people to determine the 
form of Government best suited to their needs, and do hereby declare 
and pledge that in all our actions and deliberations, their interests shall 
be paramount." 
And Donald Dewar was in no doubt about the seriousness of his 
pledge. It was a "high risk" strategy, the Scottish Labour leader said in his 
address to the Convention, "The aim must be to give Scots proper 
independence whilst still retaining our links and making a major 
contribution to the United Kingdom". It was the first outing for the 'Big I'. 
The First Six Months 
At the time of writing, the Convention is almost half-way through its 
year long deliberations. How far along the road is it now towards the "new 
body for a new age" as Canon Kenyon Wright put it during the second, 
decidedly low key meeting of the Convention in Inverness in July 1989? The 
Convention has been working through a series of committees trying to 
resolve, in a very short time, issues which were the subject of full-scale 
Royal Commissions in the 1960s and 70s. There are serious problems, and it 
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is not yet clear how these can be resolved. 
The most pressing issue is the 'method of election'. The Scottish 
Democrats, employing a little brinkmanship no doubt, have said that they 
will withdraw from the Convention if Labour do not concede Proportional 
Representation (PR). Support for PR within the Labour Party has been 
growing fast. But it's not clear that will become party policy in time for the 
Convention. Labour is currently engaged in a consultation exercise with 
party affiliates on the issue. This in itself is an achievement for the 
Convention. The Scottish Secretary of the Labour Party, Murray Elder, 
has said that the consultation on PR was "an inevitable consequence of 
Labour's participation in the Convention". Initially, many of the 
supporters of PR, around a third of the Scottish Labour MPs, plus groups 
like SLA, thought that the consultation would be a formality, and that 
electoral reform would be endorsed by acclamation in time for the 
Convention meeting on 9th December 1989. But indications now are that 
there is still widespread opposition to a reform which would effectively end 
Labour's dominance of Scottish politics. The arithmetic is formidable. In 
the 1987 General Election Labour won seventy percent of the Scottish seats 
with only forty-two percent of the popular vote. Under PR Labour 
hegemony would be ended. Many trade unionists and activists are opposed 
to Labour throwing away the prospect of ever again having an absolute 
majority in Scotland. 
As for 'legitimisation', again, at the time of wntmg, there are 
problems. The favoured method of testing Scottish opinion has been to turn 
the 1990 Scottish Regional Council elections into a kind of Referendum on 
Home Rule. Initially, Eric Milligan, the President of COSLA, was open-
minded about the idea. But now he is warning of possible legal difficulties, 
and about the costs. The Electoral Reform Society estimated the cost of a 
full-scale Home Rule Referendum in Scotland to be something between 
750k pounds and 1.5M. Most in the Convention think this could be vastly 
reduced if it 'rode on the back' of the 1990 Regional vote. But others in the 
local authority world are questioning the principle of using local elections 
for a referendum which might totally eclipse their true purpose, which is to 
return legitimate local government The turnout might also be too low to 
claim that the result was a genuine test of Scottish opinion. 
A further danger for the Convention is the b"lack pit of Constitutional 
Theory. There has been much agonising about 'powers': what areas of law-
making should the Scottish Parliament have to itself, and what should it 
leave to the UK legislature in England? 'Powers' is 1989language for what 
used to be called the 'West Lothian Question', after the cons'tituency of the 
anti-devolutionist Labour MP Tam Dalyell. The constituency may have 
ceased to exist, but unfortunately the Question has not. What Tam of the 
Binns asked was this: what are the English going to say about Scottish MPs 
being allowed to vote on English matters, when they are not allowed to vote 
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on Scottish ones? A related question is: why should England put up with the 
Scots having more MPs than their population deserves under strict 
proportionality? The Kilbrandon Commission in the 70s said that Scotland 
might have to relinquish up to 14 seats. That would not please Mr Kinnock, 
who might thus be deprived of a Labour majority in the UK Parliament. 
Leaving Mr Kinnock's problem aside for the time being, the issue of 
powers is apparently causing great anguish in Convention circles. 
Proposing an English parliament, to handle English domestic legislation, 
just opens a can of federalist worms. Would Scotland have to wait until 
England and Wales decide they want their own Assemblies before the Scots 
have a parliament in Edinburgh? Scotland could never 'federate' on its 
own. 
Then there is the question of funding. Labour's conversion to the 
Convention coincided with a hardening of their position on the economic 
autonomy of the future Scottish Parliament. Labour no longer argue for the 
'block grant' from Westminster that was envisaged in the Scotland Act in 
1978. The talk now is raising taxes in Scotland, and possibly even giving a 
kind of 'reverse block grant', a 'precept', back to Westminster for the cost 
of centrally provided services like Defence. But, it is a complex problem 
requiring expertise in taxation, law, accountancy, local authority finance 
and fiscal theory. Donald Dewar encapsulates the problem as "how to 
unblock the block grant". 
And beyond the questions of 'powers' and 'funding' there is a list of 
further problems including relations with Europe, the role of Women and 
the position of the Islands, and 'remote' areas on the Convention Agenda. 
But perhaps the two biggest problems are not directly addressed by the 
Convention working parties at all: apathy and Mrs Thatcher. 
There is little indication that the Scottish people are becoming 
enthusiastic about the Convention. My own soundings in the Glasgow 
Govan and Central constituencies, during by-elections in which the 
Convention was a major issue, suggest that few people knew what it was. It 
is still not an issue on the doorsteps. At the time of writing the Convention is 
about to issue leaflets to every household in Scotland putting the 
Convention case, and asking for a response. 
The other question is the one that has been hanging over the 
Convention from the start. The SNP pointed to it, and Canon Kenyon 
Wright alluded to it: what happens when Mrs Thatcher says 'No'. At the 
1988 Scottish Conservative Conference Mrs Thatcher said that as long as 
she was leader she would reject legislative devolution unequivocally. She 
means it. Mrs Thatcher will not countenance the creation of a socialist 
republic of Scotland, whatever theTonvention says or does. At the 1989 
Tory Conference Malcolm Rifkind appeared to be moving towards 
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conciliation. He called for a "dialogue" on the future of the Union. He 
called for "listening, sensitive, Conservatism", shades of "The Way 
Forward". But Mrs Thatcher's response, figuratively speaking, was to 
appoint the right-wing Scottish Office Minister Michael Forsyth as 
Chairman of the Scottish Party, a counterweight to any devolutionary 
backsliding. 
Conclusion 
The Convention has no real answer to the Thatcher veto, except to 
point out that she will not be around for ever and to speculate about 
electoral pacts possibly removing Mr Forsyth and the other remaining Tory 
MPs in a kind of Domesday II at the next General Election. 
And yet, for all that, the Convention can congratulate itself for having 
had a radical impact on Scottish politics in a remarkably short time. The 
theme of this piece has been the transformation of Labour's attitude to the 
National Question. This is almost entirely the consequence of the 
Convention experience, which has helped Labour shake off the discredited 
doctrines of devolution. In March 1989, Labour found themsel\'eS 
commemorating the tenth anniversary of the Devolution Referendum 
without being able to mention the word 'devolution'. Labour's Assembly 
now is much more like an autonomous national parliament, and the party is 
now talking the language of "entrenched powers", "Constitutional 
guarantees". The closely argued paragraphs of the Claim of Right, helped 
Labour discover its new Scottish policy, for good or ill. 
The Convention has also become a part of the 'Charter 88' project for 
Constitutional Reform, and the calls for a Bill of Rights, PR and a written 
Constitution for the UK. The Democrat leader Paddy Ashdown says that 
"the Convention is now the proving ground for the new politics". Given the 
recent dismal performance of the 'centre ground' that might sound more 
like a warning than a commendation. But in a period in which Scottish 
Politics has polarised between the take-it-or-leave-it unionism of Mrs 
Thatcher and Mr Forsyth, and the Euro-nationalism of the SNP, the 
Convention has held the centre together, and made it intellectually 
credible. History is not written in advance, and the Convention might, yet 
fail. But it is not a bad record for six months work. 
lain Macwhirter, Political Correspondent, BBC Radio, Scotland 
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